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Abstract：Based on the institutional economics and the control theory，and combining with the institutional context of eco⁃
nomic transition period in China， this paper，by selecting the data of China’s A-share listed corporations from 2009 to
2013，empirically tests the correlation among managerial power，institutional environment and capital expansion. The empir⁃
ical results show that the centralized management is more inclined to capital expansion，which manifests the significant in⁃
crease of the level of excessive investment，especially in private enterprises. However，the institutional environment notably
curbs the capital expansion behavior of management，which is also verified by grouping empirical research. Finally，this pa⁃
per puts forward some policy recommendations from the perspective of both macro environment and micro enterprises respec⁃
tively.













































































































































































































































































INV t = a0 + a1Grow th t - 1 + a2Lev t - 1 + a3Ca sh t - 1 +
a4Age t - 1 + a5Size t - 1 + a6ROE t - 1 + a7INV t - 1 +





















OverINV = β0 + β1Power + β3∑Con tr ols +∑Ind +
∑Year + ε （2）
OverINV = β0 + β1Power_n + β3∑Con tr ols +∑Ind
∑Year + ε （3）
OverINV = β0 + β1Power + β2Power ×Mkt +
β3∑Con tr ols +∑Ind +∑Year + ε （4）
OverINV = β0 + β1Power_n + β2Power_n ×Mkt +
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